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The asymmetric information view of ¯nancial markets posits that ¯nancial mar-
ket participants have access to private information regarding the value of a given
security, and use their private information to their strategic advantage. A large
theoretical literature is concerned with the question of how market equilibrium
will be attained, and how assets will be priced, in the presence of private infor-
mation and with the strategic use of this information.1
What is the source of \private" information in ¯nancial markets, especially
in the vast markets for government securities around the world? After all, it
is di±cult to argue that most participants in such markets are privy to much
insider information regarding the \fundamentals" underlying the value of a par-
ticular government bond. Most, if not all larger players in these markets have
access to the same computer screens, and ¯nancial and political news data.
Hence, aside from possessing heterogeneous priors due to exogenous reasons,
the forecasts they will make will di®er from each other only to the extent that
their forecasting technologies are di®erent.
There is, however, one source of truly \private" information among ¯nancial
market participants, identi¯ed by the market microstructure literature as \order
°ow." Most large players in ¯nancial markets are intermediaries, who buy and
sell securities to pro¯t from the bid-ask spread. A source of private information
is their interactions with their customers { since each dealer interacts with a
di®erent set of customers, they, in e®ect, see di®erent portions of the market
demand and supply curves, leading to di®ering \private" inferences of where
the equilibrium price might lie.
In this paper, we will analyze the role of \order °ow" as a source of private
information in ¯nancial markets, and its consequences regarding the strategic
behavior of market participants using a unique data set from the Government of
Canada securities auction market. In this market, securities dealers authorized
by the Bank of Canada place bids in debt issues of the Government of Canada
(GoC henceforth). These securities dealers bid for themselves, but they are also
allowed to submit bids on behalf of their customers. Similar to other Treasury
auction data sets used in previous microeconomic studies, we have access to
the entire set of bids submitted for a set of securities of o®erings.2 A \unique"
aspect of our data set is that we are able to observe which bids are submitted
by the dealers for themselves and which bids are submitted for their customers.
Another \unique" aspect of our data is that, along with the ¯nal set of bids, we
are also able to track how dealers modify their own and their customers' bids
on the Bank of Canada's bid submission database over time.
Given this extremely rich data source, we investigate the following questions:
1See O'Hara (1995) and the references therein for a comprehensive account of this theo-
retical literature.
2Empirical studies on Treasury auctions that also have access to bidder-level data are
Umlauf (1993), Gordy (1994), Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002), Hortacsu (2002),
Fevrier, Preguet and Visser (2002).
21. Is there evidence for private information in this market? If there is, how
does the market mechanism aggregate this information?
2. How much of this private information is due to \order °ow"? In particular,
do dealers make use of the information contained in their customers' bids,
as evidenced by observed modi¯cations in their own bids? Assuming that
dealers do modify their bids on the basis of information revealed by their
customers, do they make these modi¯cations in a manner consistent with
a rational, pro¯t-maximizing agent point of view?
3. It is reasonable to expect that customers know that they are revealing
valuable information to their dealers, and will react accordingly. Is there
any evidence for strategic behavior on the part of the customers?
Our ¯rst set of results, obtained in Sections 4-6, yields that there is a large
amount of heterogeneity in the information possessed by di®erent bidders par-
ticipating in these auctions. In particular, in section 5, we document that there
is a large degree of dispersion across dealers bids. In section 4, we document that
these dispersed bids are the result of a information gathering process that takes
place in the period leading up to the auction. Speci¯cally, we document that
o±cial bid submissions are very much concentrated within the last 15 minutes
preceding the bid submission deadline. We also document that \later" bids are
much better predictors of the auction outcome than \early" bids. We also ¯nd
bidding activity for long-term securities (bonds) are much more concentrated
within the last few minutes of the bidding window, and that this last minute
information aggregation phenomenon is much more visible for bonds than for
bills. This ¯nding is consistent with the intuition that the valuation of long-
term securities is subject to much more uncertainty, and hence, the incremental
value, and hence the value of waiting for, new pieces of information to arrive, is
larger.
Our next set of results delve deeper into the nature of this information
gathering process that precedes the auction. In particular, in section 6, we ¯nd
strong evidence that dealers delay their own bids until they receive the bids of
their customers, who, in turn, wait until the last minutes of the auction to bid.
Once again, there is a visible di®erence between these temporal patterns across
bonds and bills: dealers' tendency to \wait" for customer bids is much more
pronounced in bond auctions as opposed to bill auctions, suggesting that the
information contained in customer bids is more important in bond auctions as
opposed to bill auctions.
We then analyze whether dealers indeed incorporate the information con-
tained in customer bids in their own bids. In section 6, we analyze data on
modi¯cations in dealers' bids, and, controlling for public information that might
be driving these bid modi¯cations, we ¯nd that two sources of private informa-
tion drive these bid changes. The ¯rst source of private information is the
information contained in modi¯cations to customer bids, which are observed by
the dealers through which these customers bid. The second source of private
information is the net long or short position of a dealer, obtained throughout
3the bidding process, through over-the-counter when-issued transactions with
customers.
These results suggest that an important source of dispersion in dealers' bids,
and hence a source of private information in this market, is the information con-
tained in customer bids. In section 5, we also document that, controlling for size,
dealers with access to more customers are better able to predict market out-
comes. Hence, we our results are consistent with the simple theoretical intuition
that \more information is better" when making decisions under uncertainty.
Next, we focus on the \customer" side of the market. One might expect that
customers, especially those with large orders, will realize the strategic value of
the information contained in their bids, and react accordingly. In particular,
in section 7.2, we observe that some customers spread their bids across several
dealers. We also ¯nd that customers are more likely to route their bids through
more than one dealer when the customer has a large quantity of security to buy
(and hence is more likely to "move the market"). this e®ect is more pronounced
for bond auctions compared with treasury bill auctions, replicating the \infor-
mation gathering" hypothesis across treasury bill and bonds observed in the
dealer-side of the market.
An analysis of bids that arrive after the auction submission deadline in Sec-
tion 7.1, reveals that most of these are dealer bids submitted in bond auctions.
Presumably customers hold-o® submitting their bids as long as they can; dealers
bids that incorporate these customer bids arrive after the auction submission
deadline and are rejected. <cr> Interestingly, we also ¯nd in Section 7.3 that
some large customers who do not route their bids through multiple dealers in
an auction are in long-term relationships with their dealers. Since repeated
relationships with a customer provide valuable information to the dealers, it
is conceivable that dealers compensate the customers for this information. By
looking at the di®erence in the average price paid and the cuto® price, we ¯nd
that customers who are in a long-term relationship in the bond sector pay a
lower price in bond auctions when they submit tenders through the dealer with
whom they are in a long-term relationship, compared with when they submit
tenders through other dealers. Customers who have a long-term relationship in
the treasury bill sector but participate in the bond auctions, pay a lower price
for bonds when they submit tenders through this long-term dealer compared
with when they submit tender through other dealers. This price is comparable
to that paid by customers with a long-term relationship in the bond sector,
for the tenders submitted through the long-term dealer. Finally, customers in
a long-term relationship pay a higher price for tenders submitted through the
long-term dealer compared to customers who are not in a long-term relation-
ship. This overpayment is greater when the long-term relationship is in bonds
compared with treasury bills. It is conceivable that these customers are com-
pensated by the long-term dealer in a sector other than Government of Canada
securities. Once gain, the pay-o® hypotheses show that the customer-side of
the primary market re°ects the last minute \information gathering" hypothesis
for longer-term securities relative to shorter-term securities formulated from the
dealer-side in sections 4-6.
4Thus, our results shed light into the workings of the \black box" surround-
ing the source and aggregation of private information in government securities
markets, and the formation of customer-dealer relationships as a response to
the exchange of valuable information across these two parties. It also points
to one of the bene¯ts of being a dealer, that of having private access to order
°ow information. Of course, as in any industry with ¯xed costs, some rev-
enues above marginal cost are needed to sustain entry; hence, one may regard
the informational advantage possessed by the dealers as this additional revenue
component.3
The importance of \order-°ow" as a source of private information, and the
strategic incentives possessed by dealers or marketmakers in response to having
access to order °ow information has been recognized by a large theoretical lit-
erature in ¯nance (see for example, O'Hara (1995) and the numerous references
within). Empirical work on the role played by \order °ow" in asset pricing has
been conducted in various securities markets. These include foreign exchange
markets (Lyons (2001) and the references within, Evans and Lyons (2002), Ito,
Lyons and Melvin (1998)), equity trades (Hansch,Naik and Viswanathan (1998))
and option trades (Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998)). Aside from Hansch,
Naik and Viswanathan (1998), this literature has used data aggregate, market-
level data to investigate the importance of aggregate measures of order-°ow and
trading activity on asset prices.
Empirical work that is closest to ours has been conducted by Drudi and
Massa (2001), who examine the individual trading behavior of government se-
curities dealers on the primary (auction) market and the interdealer exchange,
using a detailed ¯xed-income transaction database from Italy. Their starkest
¯nding is that dealers behave strategically on the interdealer market to ma-
nipulate outcomes in the auction market. Massa and Simonov (2001) use the
same data source to investigate strategic trading in the interdealer exchange,
and ¯nd, consistent with our ¯ndings, that information gained from secondary
market trading can a®ect bidding behavior in the primary market. Massa and
Simonov (2003) document that long-term interactions between dealers leads to
the formation of \dealer reputations," which a®ect the informational content
that counterparties ascribe to the trades originating from these dealers.
Our results complement the ¯ndings of Drudi and Massa (2001) and Massa
and Simonov (2001, 2003) in delving deeper into the sources of private informa-
tion and strategic behavior in government securities markets, especially in the
primary market. Isolating what drives private information is important in these
3Aside from setting up the technological infrastructure to participate in these auctions, as
discussed in section 2, dealers may be thought of incurring ¯xed costs due to the regulations
they need to comply by. For example, primary dealers are subject to minimum bidding
requirements to keep their status, this may be construed as a ¯xed cost of doing business.
Sareen (2002) argues that the primary dealership system, whereby the issuer makes access to
advantages conditional on the dealers satisfying obligations is a means to resolve the agency
problem between the issuer and the security dealers. When the number of security dealers is
small perhaps due to high entry costs on account of obligations that a dealer has to satisfy,
this argument becomes especially convincing.
5markets, since theoretical and policy analyses regarding the design of the auc-
tion and surrounding market rules rely very sensitively on the exact speci¯cation
of the informational and strategic environment (see Binmore and Swierbinski
(2003), Sareen (2003) for recent surveys of the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on the design of Treasury auctions). In contrast to the work of Drudi, Massa
and Simonov, however, our analysis focuses on the dealer-customer interaction,
rather than the interactions between di®erent dealers.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: in the next section, we
describe the institutional arrangement and rules of the Government of Canada
securities markets. Section 3 describes our data base, and provides summary
statistics regarding the composition of securities and participating ¯rms in this
market. Section 4 describes the temporal patterns in information aggregation.
Section 5 describes the heterogeneity in dealer bids, and Section 6 provides an
explanation for this heterogeneity through customer bids. Section 7 describes
customer and dealer relationships in light of the documented information trans-
mission between these parties. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Institution
The Bank of Canada, on behalf of the Government of Canada (GoC hence-
forth), issues bonds with a maturity of 30, 10, 5 and 2 years, and treasury bills
with a maturity of 1 year, 3 months and 6 months.4 The process for issuing
a \typical" GoC debt instrument links three markets: the when-issued market,
primary market or the auction, and the secondary market. The process begins
with government securities distributors (dealers henceforth) typically taking
short positions in the when-issued market through forward contracts with other
participants, for the yet-to-be auctioned security.5 Subsequently, dealers at-
tempt to cover these short positions by buying the security from other dealers
in the when-issued market, from the issuer in the primary market, and ¯nally
from another dealer in the secondary market after the auction. In all instances,
being pro¯t maximizing agents, they will attempt to buy the securities in which
they have a short position at the cheapest price.6 Details of the three markets
are given below.
The when-issued market precedes the auction by a week. Participants
engage in forward trading for the yet-to-be auctioned security in the when-issued
market.
Following the when-issued market is the primary market, where the Bank of
Canada issues GOC securities through a discriminatory price auction. Potential
4Treasury bills are zero-coupon bonds.
5The Bank of Canada designates certain institutions as distributors of government securi-
ties. These institutions are obligated to buy and sell securities to individual investors.
6If the price at which dealers buy the securities in which they have a short position is less
(greater) than the price at which they have pre-sold the security in the when-issued market,
dealers make a pro¯t (loss) ex-post.
6bidders in the government securities auctions can be classi¯ed into three groups:
primary dealers, other government securities distributors and customers, where
\other government securities distributors" refers to government securities dis-
tributors excluding primary dealers. The key distinction between government
securities distributors and customers is that the latter cannot bid on their own
account in the auction; rather government securities distributors submit bids
on behalf of customers. Thus, Government securities distributors submit bids
on their account and on behalf of the customers, being \bidders" in the former
and \submitters" in the latter case. The distinction between primary dealers
and other government securities distributors is that the former are subject to
minimum bid obligations, as both \bidder" and \submitter", in the form of a
minimum quantity constraint and a binding price constraint.7 A customer can
chose to submit bids through more than one dealer in an auction.
Bids can be submitted as competitive tenders and noncompetitive tenders,
with the focus of this paper being on competitive tenders (tenders henceforth).8
Typically, a participant's tender will comprise of price-quantity pairs, and the
participant's net position of the yet-to-be auctioned security at the point of time
the tender is submitted. Net position at a point in time refers to the participant's
net holdings (whether long or short) of the security being auctioned at that
point of time. A customer's tender may comprise only price-quantity pairs as a
customer has the option of submitting his net positions directly to the Bank of
Canada instead of communicating it through the tender(s) he submits through
dealers. Participants can revise or cancel previously submitted tenders prior
to the auction deadline; there are no limits on the number of revisions that an
auction participant can make.
Submitted tenders are allotted through a discriminatory price auction.
The primary market is followed by trading in an active resale market for the
\new issue" called the secondary market.
Both the when-issued and the secondary markets comprise the resale market
for GOC securities. The resale market can be decomposed into two: the inter-
dealer market and the customer-dealer market. In the customer-dealer market,
institutional investors (for example, pension funds, mutual funds) trade with
dealers on a bilateral over-the-counter basis over the telephone, with the re-
sult of these transactions known only to the two counterparties participating
in the transaction. This is in contrast to the interdealer market that oper-
ates primarily through electronic interdealer brokers, who post on an electronic
screen, bid, o®ers, and trade outcomes communicated to him by the dealers
telephonically, without revealing the identity of the dealer. While only dealers
can post quotes or trade through the interdealer brokers, both customers and
7A primary dealer has to submit his threshold bid at a yield which is within 5 cents of the
highest accepted yield. A threshold bid is a bid that makes the cumulative amount of the
quantity bid greater than or equal to a primary dealer's lower quantity constraint.
8A noncompetitive tender comprises a quantity subject to an upper bound of $3 million,
with a participant being allowed to submit a single noncompetitive tender.
7dealers have viewing access to the electronic screens of an interdealer broker
via CanPX, a data service that consolidates and disseminates the trade and
quote information provided by the interdealer brokers.
3 Data
Our data set captures several aspects of the primary and the resale markets. For
the primary market we have data over the period October 1998 to March 2003.
For the resale market we have data over the period July 4, 2001 to September
10, 2001, and February 25, 2002 to February 27, 2003. Henceforth, a GoC
security will be uniquely identi¯ed by it's maturity date and coupon rate if it is
a bond, and by a maturity date if it is a treasury bill. An auction will refer to
the issuance of a GoC security of a speci¯c maturity range (30, 10, 5, 2 years for
bonds and 1 year, 6 months, 3 months for treasury bills), held at a speci¯c time;
thus, an auction for a GoC security will be uniquely identi¯ed by the maturity
range and the date on which it is held.
3.1 Primary Market
Two aspects of the primary market data are distinguished: the hierarchical
aspect of the data, and the o±cial vs history aspect of the data.
There are three level in our hierarchical data base: auction level, tender
level, bid level.
Auction Level
For each auction we have the issue amount; issue date and maturity date
of the auctioned security; total amount bid; total amount allotted; cuto® yield;
total bid amount at the cuto® yield; coupon rate (if the GoC security is a bond).
Tender Level
For each tender submitted in an auction, we have the following informa-
tion: tender type (competitive or noncompetitive); time-stamp of the tender
indicating the time at which the tender was submitted in the auction; tender
status, in that it is a submitted by the participant, cancelled by the participant
or rejected by the issuer;9 identity of the submitter of the tender; identity of
the bidder of the tender; participant type of the bidder (primary dealer, other
government securities distributor, customer, Bank of Canada) and submitter
(primary dealer, other government securities distributor); net position amount
9Tenders received before the auction deadline will have a status of \submitted" or \can-
celled". A participant can cancel his last submitted tender. No bid level information is
available for cancelled tenders. Tenders received after the auction deadline will have a status
of \pending submission" or \pending cancellation". These tenders will either be accepted or
rejected by the issuer, with a tender beyond the auction deadline usually being accepted by
the issuer if it is on account of transmission failure, and rejected otherwise. The former if
accepted has a status of \submitted", and the latter if accepted has the status of \cancelled".
All rejected tenders have the status of \rejected".
8indicating a participant's net holdings of the yet-to-be auctioned security at
that time,10 with the exception of net positions reported directly to the Bank
of Canada by a customer;11 the allotted tenders of each bidder.
Bid Level
We have the bid amount and yield pairs for each tender submitted by a
participant; the maximum amount a participant can bid as a \submitter", and
as a \bidder"; and the amount allotted to each participant.
In addition to the hierarchical aspect of this data, we also distinguish the
o±cial vs history aspect of the data. As mentioned before, a bidder can revise
a submitted tender before the auction deadline.12 All tender revisions and the
constituent bid level revisions, made by each participant in the auction will
be referred to as the history of the auction. For each auction participant, the
unique tender and the constituent bids in this tender that are used to determine
the cuto® yield and the allotment of the auctioned security is referred to as
o±cial data.13 Thus, the o±cial data is a subset of the history data.
4 Temporal Patterns in Bidding Behavior and
Information Aggregation
Bank of Canada securities auctions have a ¯xed bid submission deadline, and
bidders are allowed to submit bids for a particular auction two weeks ahead of
time. Since our data set includes the time stamps for each tender (o±cial or not)
submitted by the dealers, we can analyze the timing of o±cial bid submissions.
In Figure 1, we plot the cumulative distribution function of o±cial bid sub-
mission times for di®erent subsamples of our data set. First, observe that bid-
ding activity is very much concentrated within the hour before the submission
deadline. Ninety percent of all competitive bids, those that specify a price as
well as a quantity, are submitted in the last 20 minutes of the submission dead-
line. In contrast, observe that non-competitive bids, i.e. those that do not
specify a price, tend to come much later than competitive bids. The median
10A net position has to reported with a revised tender only if the change in the net position
since the last submitted tender exceeds $25 million.
11Customers can submit their net positions to the issuer instead of revealing them to the
dealer when submitting their tenders through them. This has to be done 30 minutes before
the auction deadline unless there is a change in the net position by $25 million, in which case
the latest net position reported is recorded. For customers who submit net positions directly
to the issuer, only the last net position amount reported by a customer before the auction
deadline is available; the history of revisions in the net position is not available.
12While the tender revision is to be done before the auction deadline, in blah % of our
sample we ¯nd the revisions done after the auction deadline.
13An o±cial tender is the last submitted or cancelled tender of a participant. While in blah
% of the auctions, the o±cial tender is submitted before the auction deadline, we do have
cases where the o±cial tender was submitted after the auction deadline. This could be due
to transmission, as well as, strategic reasons.
9competitive bid comes in 7.9 minutes before the deadline, whereas the median
non-competitive bids comes in 26.5 minutes before the deadline.
A similar phenomenon of \last minute bidding" has been documented on In-
ternet auctions by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Roth and Ockenfels (2002).
However, Internet auctions are open- ascending auctions where bidders can see
and respond to each others bids, whereas Bank of Canada's auctions are sealed
bid auctions in which dealers do not observe other dealers' bidding activity.
Hence, \hiding information" from rivals, which is the primary explanation pro-
posed by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), should not be the primary concern of the
securities dealers.
One explanation for the last-minute concentration of bids is that, especially
for competitive bids, new information is very important in forming expectations
about the appropriate value of the security being auctioned. Hence, bidders are
reluctant to commit to a price until they are certain that no new information
will be released.
An observation that appears consistent with this explanation is the di®er-
ence between the bid submission times for long-term vs. short-term securities
seen in Figure 1. The submission timings for long-term securities are much more
concentrated at the very last minutes of the auction, with the median o±cial bid
for securities with maturity greater than one year coming 2.5 minutes before the
auction deadline, as opposed to 9.3 minutes for securities with maturities less
than or equal to one year. Pricing longer maturity securities depends quite sen-
sitively on expectations about the future, and since many more factors enter into
forming expectations about the long-term rather than the short-term, one may
expect bidding decisions to be more responsive to arrival of new information.
We now bolster the information gathering hypothesis by presenting evidence
that later bids are more informative of the auction outcome. To do this, we ¯rst
categorized o±cial bids in every auction by their submission times by dividing
time into 5 minute periods leading up to the deadline. Since bids come in the
form of multiple price-quantity pairs, i.e. demand schedules, we calculated the






We then calculate the \informativeness" of each bid by calculating the absolute
di®erence between pQW and the \cuto®" price of the auction, i.e. lowest price at
which the securities were sold. Since Bank of Canada securities auctions follow
the discriminatory (pay-your-bid) pricing format, a bidder bidding right at the
\cut-o®-price" will make the highest pro¯t (assuming, of course, all bidders
derive the same value from winning the auction).
Figure 2 plots, as an average over all auctions in our data set, both the num-
ber of bids received in each 5 minute time interval, and their \informativeness,"
as measured by the absolute di®erence between the bid price and the cut-o®
10price. Observe ¯rst that, consistent with the discussion above, many more bids
arrive late than early. Observe also that the average \absolute prediction error"
of bids declines from 15 basis points at the 30 minute mark to 2.5 cents within
the last 5 minutes. This suggests that the early bids, on average, re°ect valu-
ations that are quite far from the \average market sentiment" re°ected in the
cut-o® price in the auction.
In ¯gure 3, we see that this \information aggregation at the last-minute"
phenomenon is much more pronounced for long-term securities than for short-
term securities auctions. In this ¯gure, we compare a normalized informative-







5mins¡pcutoffj, i.e. the ratio of the absolute prediction error of the bids that
are submitted at time t, and the absolute prediction error of the bids that are
submitted in the last 5 minutes of the auction. Observe that this ratio is con-
stant around 1 for short-term securities auctions, suggesting that earlier bids
are as good predictors of the auction outcome as later bids. In contrast, for
longer term securities, bids that come in more than 30 minutes before the auc-
tion deadline have absolute prediction errors that are 10 times as large as bids
that come in the last 10 minutes.
5 Dispersion in Dealers' Bidding Performance
One explanation for the temporal patterns described in the previous section is
that bid submissions respond to publicly observed information °ows. All dealers
taking part in the Bank of Canada securities auctions have access to global and
local ¯nancial news sources, and can monitor trading activity between dealers on
the electronic interdealer trading platforms.14 Since dealers acting strategically
to maximize pro¯ts from the auction will try to make use of all the information
they can get, they will wait until the last possible moment to cumulate these
pieces of public information in their bids.
If all bidders have access to the same publicly available information, we
might expect them to submit very similar bids in the auction, or, at least,
give similar bids on average (i.e. there might be random deviations in each
bidder's strategy from auction to auction, but, on average, bidders will submit
price bids that are similar). The numbers in Table 1 (predictiondispersion.pdf),
however, suggest otherwise. In this table, we calculated the absolute value of
the di®erence between each dealer's quantity-weighted price bids and the cuto®
price of the auction. We then averaged these \prediction error" measures over
our subsamples of auctions of securities with similar maturities. The results in
Table 1 suggest substantial dispersion in the cuto®-price prediction performance
of the 21 dealers in our data set. In particular, the standard deviation of the
dealers' performance is almost as large as the mean absolute prediction error.
14The electronic interdealer market accounts for 86% of the volume traded on the interdealer
market.
11What may explain this large dispersion across dealers' bidding performances?
If all bidders have access to the same information sources, and all of them value
the security in the same way, it is di±cult to fathom that they would bid prices
that are very di®erent from each others. Hence, one explanation is that dif-
ferent bidders have access to di®erent, private information sources. Another
explanation is that some bidders are simply better at utilizing (possibly pub-
licly available) information to make a forecast about the auction cuto® price.
This di®erential in forecast ability may come from having better skilled traders,
or having better organizational decision making capabilities. There may also
be a ¯xed cost associated with utilizing econometric/statistical technology to
make forecasts. Hence, this second explanation may suggest a connection be-
tween bidder performance and the size of the bidder's operation.
We now investigate the determinants of the dispersion in the prediction
performance of the dealers. The ¯rst step of this exercise is summarized in the
series of regressions reported in Table 2. In the ¯rst column, we sought the
correlation of dealer prediction performance with the (log) average size of the
quantity bids placed by the dealer for its own account across all the auctions
in our data set. Controlling for categorical variables accounting for di®erent
maturity levels, we ¯nd that dealer size is actually positively correlated with
the size of the average prediction errors. This result appears contradictory with
a theory of bidder performance in which size would become positively correlated
with bidding performance through forces of competitive selection.
However, note that the \size" variable we have selected are the dealer's
own bids, submitted, presumably, for speculative purposes. Another, perhaps
more important, source of revenue for a dealer is to intermediate transactions
by its customers who do not have direct access to bidding. The advantage
from intermediating customer bids is that a dealer has the opportunity to get a
\second opinion" as to what the market's valuation of the security being sold.
Hence, the more \second opinions" that a dealer gets, the better its forecast
may become.
One could easily rationalize this intuition with a standard Bayesian updating
model of expectation formation, in which the dealer has a prior belief about
the unknown security value, v, where the prior has mean ¹ and variance ¾2
v.
Suppose the dealer also has a private signal about the security value, x, which
is distributed about the true value of the security with mean zero error, i.e.
x = v+"x, where " is distributed with zero mean and variance ¾2
"x. If all of the
aforementioned random variables are distributed normally, conditional on this








where ¿v = 1
¾2
v and ¿"x = 1
¾2
"x
, are the precisions of the prior and private signals
respectively.
12Now, if the dealer receives another signal about the security's true value, in
the form of a customer bid, for example, she will incorporate this information
into her conditional expectation. Speci¯cally, call this piece of information y,
where y = v +"y, also distributed with mean zero noise about the true security
value. Given y, the conditional expectation becomes:
E(vjx;y) =
¿v
¿v + ¿"x + ¿"y
¹ +
¿"x
¿v + ¿"x + ¿"y
x +
¿"y
¿v + ¿"x + ¿"y
y (3)
i.e. a simple linear combination of the di®erent pieces of information that the
bidder received, weighted by their relative precisions.
It is also easy to see that the variance of this conditional expectation as
an estimate of true value of the security, v, is lower when the dealer observes
the additional piece of information y, as opposed to when she does not. In
particular, the variance of the estimator should decline with the number of
independent additional signals that the dealer observes.
The second and third columns of Table 2 appear to provide support to
this intuition. In the second regression to explain di®erences in cuto® price
prediction performance, we add a variable for the log of the average size of the
customer bid relayed by the dealer. As suggested by the discussion above, the
size of customer bids is negatively correlated with the prediction error. The
addition of this variable appears also takes away some of the signi¯cance of the
positive \own size" e®ect.
In the third column, we also add the (average) number of unique customers
that a dealer serves into the prediction performance regression. We ¯nd that
the coe±cient on the number of unique customers is negative and signi¯cant at
the 5-percent level, with the estimate suggesting that an additional customer
reduces mean absolute prediction error by 9 cents! Interestingly, the negative
coe±cient on customer order size loses its signi¯cance, and declines in value,
suggesting that the number of independent opinions contained in the customer
opinions may matter more in decreasing predictive performance than the size
of the customer orders.
The ¯nal column of Table 2 investigates a comparative static suggested by
the discrepancy in temporal bidding patterns across long-term and short-term
securities that we found in the previous section. Recall that we argued that
the temporal patterns suggested that \information gathering" played a more
important role for longer maturity securities than for short-term securities. If
this argument is correct, we should also expect the \predictive advantage" from
having an additional customer's opinion to be higher in longer maturity secu-
rities auctions than in short maturity auctions. Indeed, in the regression we
run in the fourth column of Table 2 ¯nds that the coe±cient on the number
of unique customers served by a dealer, is signi¯cantly negative only when in-
teracted with an indicator for long-maturity securities auctions. The coe±cient
estimate suggests that for securities with maturity above 1 year, an additional
customer accounts for an improvement in prediction accuracy of up to 24 cents {
13a rather large number when compared to the performance di®erentials reported
in Table 1.
A ¯nal note about the regression in Table 2 is the interpretation of the posi-
tive coe±cient of the dealer's own \size" variable. A dealer's demand for a given
security may possess a private value component, as well as a pure common value
component, as modelled above. For example, as is the case in Canada, a primary
dealer may have to ful¯ll a minimum bidding requirement to preserve its privi-
leged position. Hence, the primary dealer may ¯nd it necessary to knowingly bid
above the cuto® price to ful¯ll this requirement. This would, of course, degrade
the dealer's prediction performance as measured here. Since primary dealers
are also the largest dealers in the market, this behavioral bias may explain the
persistent positive correlation between size and prediction performance.
6 Dealer Bidding Behavior and Customer Or-
ders
We now present more direct evidence for the hypothesis that found substantial
support in the analysis of the previous section: \Dealers bid di®erently because
they have access to di®erent information sources. Two important sources of
private information are customer bids and the forward (short or long) position
of a dealer."
We will present two sets of evidence. We will ¯rst contrast the submission
timings of dealer bids with the submission timings of customer bids, and present
evidence that dealer bids lag customer bids. We will then argue that dealers'
price bids re°ect the informational content of customer bids, by showing that
innovations in dealer bids follow innovations in customer bids very closely. We
will also show that dealer bids are a®ected by the dealer's net short or long
position.
6.1 Do Dealer Bids Follow Customer Bids?
Table 3 displays evidence for the hypothesis that dealers will submit their own
bids after seeing customers' bids. To construct this table, we looked at all
instances in which a dealer submitted own her own behalf as well as for a number
of customers. We then compared the submission time of the latest customer bid
to the submission time of the dealer's own bid using a pair-wise t-test (i.e. the
within dealer di®erence). The test, when conducted for the entire spectrum of
maturities reveals that dealer bids lag the latest customer bid by 0.43 minutes,
the di®erence being statistically signi¯cant at the 1.7% level. Furthermore, we
¯nd that dealer bids lag customer bids 55% of the time.
However, as the next column of Table 3 shows, the di®erence in the timing
between dealer and customer bids do not appear to statistically di®erent for
short-term securities. Dealer bids lag customer bids 52% of the time { not
visibly (or, as it appears, statistically) di®erent from an even split.
14In contrast, dealer bids appear to lag customer bids much more visibly in
auctions for longer-term securities. Not only both customer and dealer appear
to come much later for these auctions, as was found in Section 4.1, dealer bids,
on average, are submitted 2.5 minutes later than the latest customer bid. The
lag is statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. Moreover, dealer bids lag customer
bids 74.9% of the time in these auctions.
Hence, the evidence suggests that dealers react to the information contained
in their customers' bids when and where it matters. In particular, the second
and third columns of Table 3 con¯rm our ¯ndings so far regarding the di®erence
in the importance of \customer information" across longer term vs. shorter term
securities auctions. Granted, given that customer bids also come very near the
bid submission deadline, one may suspect that dealers will have little time to
perform elaborate calculations. However, our data suggests that, on average, a
minute or two appears to su±ce.
6.2 Do Dealer Bids Respond To the Informational Con-
tent of Customer Bids?
We now investigate whether dealers change their bids in response to the ar-
rival of customer bids, and whether the direction and magnitude of this change
is explained by the informational content of the customer order. To do this,
we utilize the bid history aspect of our data set, which comprises of all bids
submitted by the dealers, not just the o±cial bids. This allows us to track the
modi¯cations that dealers make in their bids on Bank of Canada's computerized
bidding system.
To calculate modi¯cations in dealers' bids, we ¯x a time interval, starting
T = 10 or T = 30 minutes prior to the bid submission deadline, until the
submission deadline. We then calculate the \standing bid" of the dealer at time
T, which is the dealer's most recent bid as of time T. However, the dealer can
change this bid until the bid submission deadline. Thus, we ¯nd the dealer's
\o±cial" bid, i.e. the ¯nal bid by the dealer that is accepted by the Bank of
Canada. We then calculate the di®erence between the (natural logs) of the
dealer's o±cial bid and her standing bid at T minutes prior to the deadline.
Since bids comprise of multiple price-quantity points, we take the quantity-
weighted average price as the bid.
We then perform the same calculation for the customers, taking the (log)
di®erence between their o±cial bid and their standing bids at T minutes prior
to the bid submission deadline. Thus, the change in a dealer's information
set between time T and the auction deadline includes these modi¯cations in
customer bids.
Another piece of information that the dealer obtains within this time pe-
riod is through the over-the-counter customer-dealer market, where the dealer
engages in forward short or long trades. Unfortunately, we do not have ac-
cess to this trading information. However, since by law dealers have to report
changes in their net long or short positions to the Bank of Canada along with
any changes to their bids, we observe net impact of this trading activity through
15modi¯cations to the dealers positions. Again, we code these modi¯cations as
the di®erence between a dealer's \standing" net position at T minutes prior to
the deadline, and the net position reported along with the dealer's o±cial bid.
Aside from these two sources of information, which are privately observed,
dealers may also modify their bids within the last T of an auction due to news
coming from public information sources. Moreover, customers may also be
modifying their bids in response to the release of the same public information
{ hence an observed correlation between dealer bid modi¯cations and customer
bid modi¯cations may be due to the fact that both parties are responding to the
same information source (the forward position of a dealer may also be responding
to public information). Hence, we have to control for the presence of public
information within the chosen time interval to identify a causal relationship
between customer bid modi¯cations and dealer bid modi¯cations.15
We do this by utilizing an auction-level ¯xed e®ect speci¯cation. This
amounts to looking at the variation across dealer bid modi¯cations in the last
T minutes within a given auction, and how much of this variation is explained
by customer bid modi¯cations observed by each dealer in this time period. One
weakness of the auction-level ¯xed e®ect speci¯cation is that it assumes that
the linear relationship between dealer bid modi¯cations and customer bid mod-
i¯cations (and net position changes) is the same across di®erent auctions in
our data. We relax this assumption somewhat by conducting our analysis on
Treasury bills and bonds separately.
Table 4 reports the results of the auction-level ¯xed e®ect regressions. The
dependent variable in this table is the modi¯cation in a dealer's bid during
the last 10 or 30 minutes of an auction. Note that in both time intervals,
modi¯cations in customer bids are positively and signi¯cantly correlated with
modi¯cations in dealer bids. The point estimates imply that a 1% increase
in customers' price bids within the last 10 minutes implies a 0.297% increase
in the dealer's bid. Within the last 30 minutes, the e®ect is smaller { a 1%
15We should note that most Central Banks including Canada, set auction deadline timing
so that it does not coincide with major news releases like monetary policy target or income
and employment data. However, it is possible that other sources of ¯nancial news, such as
developments in U.S. ¯nancial markets, may a®ect asset prices in Canada. One way to control
for the presence of public information °ows is to proxy for this using real-time trading prices for
securities that might be close substitutes to the security being auctioned. We actually observe
this additional piece of data. In Canada, CanPX a data service, consolidates trade and quote
data submitted by Canada's ¯xed income electronic interdealer-brokers. This information
is disseminated to both customers and dealers.16 Potentially, both customers and dealers
could track the impact of any publicly observed information shock on prices right uptill the
auction deadline, and consequently make modi¯cations in the bids they submit in the auction.
However, when we looked at CanPX data to extract proxies for public information °ows. Even
though we have documented that 99% of the bid modi¯cations are made in the last 30 minutes
before the auction deadline, for each auction in the sample, we looked at CanPX data for a
two-week window prior to the auction coinciding with the time when the when-issued market
commences. We observed no trade or quote activity for the yet-to-be-auctioned security in
the entire period covered by our sample. This empirical fact was puzzling given that the basis
for a when-issued market is price discovery. However, these results are consistent withe the
¯ndings of Drudi and Massa (2001) that dealers try to hide order°ow information from other
market participants in the Italian market for government securities.
16upward revision in customers' bids translates into a 0.094% upward revision by
the dealer. However, the fact that the correlation between dealer bid revisions
and customer bid revision within the last 30 minutes is smaller than in the last
10 minutes is consistent with the observation that few customers are active at
the 30 minute mark { thus modi¯cations in these bids do not a®ect the dealer's
bid as much as modi¯cations by customers who arrive later. In fact, if when we
compared the number of \strategic" customers (de¯ned as those who modi¯ed
their bids at least once within an auction) who were active (i.e. had submitted
a bid) at T = 10 vs. T = 30, we found that more such customers were active at
T = 10 as opposed to at T = 30.
When we conduct the auction-level ¯xed e®ects regression for the subsam-
ples of Treasury bills and bonds separately, an interesting pattern emerges that
appears consistent with our previous ¯ndings. We ¯nd that for both the T = 10
and T = 30 time intervals, the correlation between dealer bid modi¯cations and
customer bid modi¯cations is much stronger in bond auctions than in Treasury
bill auctions { in fact, the correlation in Treasury bill auctions is very near zero
in both time intervals (although the correlation in the T = 30 interval for bonds
was estimated with low precision owing to the small sample size, the point esti-
mate is of the right sign). This is consistent with our earlier results suggesting
that information contained in customer bids matters much more in bond auc-
tions (which are harder to price since bond prices are, presumably, subject to
more uncertainty) than in Treasury bill auctions.
Our regressions also indicate that changes in net positions of a dealer are
important drivers of modi¯cations in the dealer's bid. Once again, the e®ect
appears much stronger in bond auctions as opposed to Treasury bill auctions {
this is most likely due to the fact net positions, and thus net position changes in
bond auctions are much larger (about 20 times) than in Treasury bill auctions
(which is also driven by the fact that bond auctions are typically much larger
on average than bill auctions). As for the sign of the estimated coe±cient it is
interesting to note the sign change across the last 10 minutes vs. the last 30
minutes in the (bond) auctions. Intuitively, it is not entirely clear what sign
we should expect: assuming that the auction price is positively correlated with
the secondary market trading price of the security, one might expect a dealer
with a large short position to try to bid low so as to depress prices in the resale
market, so that she can cover her short positions at as low a price as possible.
On the other hand, one might expect a dealer with a large short position to
bid high in the auction to cover as much of her short position to avoid being
squeezed in the secondary market. Based on our results, unfortunately, we can
not tell between these two possible hypotheses.
Taken together, the results of this section and section 5 suggest that customer
bids provide private information to dealers and that dealers make use of their
ability to observe customer bids. We also note that interactions with customers
through forward (when-issued) transactions also drive dealer bids in this market.
177 Customers Respond to Dealer's Use of Order-
Flow Information
In the previous sections, by looking at the dealer-side of the primary market,
we found considerable support for the hypothesis that an important source of
private information for dealers is customer bids, and that dealers use customer
bids to revise their opinion about where the cuto® price in the auction might be.
In this section we present evidence to support this hypothesis from the customer
side of the primary market. Customers realize that dealers through whom they
submit bids, revise their opinion about where the cuto® price will be, on the
basis of customer bids. We present three features of customer bidding behaviour,
which can be viewed as strategic responses of customers to bid revision by dealers
on observing customer bids.
In section 7.1, we investigate the hypothesis that by holding-o® bid submis-
sion till just before the auction deadline, customers can try to prevent dealers
from making strategic use of their order °ow information. Since a dealer wants
to condition on as much customer information as possible, customers may try
to push a dealer \beyond the deadline" by submitting their bids at the last
minute, and force the dealer to risk giving his own bid later than the deadline.
In Section 7.2, customers attempt to conceal their entire demand schedule from
a single dealer by using multiple dealers to submit bids. In Section 7.3 we show
that some customers are in a long-term relationship with a dealer in that they
use a distinct dealer to submit their bids across all auctions. Presumably these
repeated interactions provide dealers with valuable information about the cuto®
price in the auction, for which they are likely to compensate the customers. We
¯nd that the payo® to the customer takes the form of the customer paying a
lower price for the securities at the auction when he submits bids through his
long-term dealer compared with other dealers, re°ecting that the tendency to
revise bids by dealers is less pronounced when the dealer's bid revision is con-
ditional on the bid of a customer with whom he is in a long-term relationship.
Finally, in parallel with the di®erence in the \information gathering" hypothe-
sis between bonds and treasury bills, formulated in Section 5, we ¯nd that the
strategic responses of the customer to bid revision by the dealer are much more
pronounced in bond auctions compared with treasury bill auctions.
Thus, the customer-side of the primary market re°ects the \information
gathering" hypothesis formulated from the dealer-side in sections 5-6.
7.1 Last Minute Bidding by Customers Leads to Late Bids
by Dealers
In Section 6.1 we observe that while customer bids lag dealer bids, customer
bids come quite close to the submission deadline as well. A possible reason
for this could be that customers attempt to conceal their demand curves from
dealers as long as they can, as they realize that dealers will use these to revise
18their own bids. We now look at late tenders to investigate this proposition: do
customers bid close to the submission deadline to prevent dealers from revising
their bids on seeing customer bids. Late tenders will refer to bids that arrived
after the o±cial bid,17 and were rejected by the issuer for being submitted after
the submission deadline.
If customers could indeed prevent dealers from using their order°ow infor-
mation by holding-o® submission of their bids till just before the submission
deadline, we would expect to see a signi¯cant number of late bids from dealers:
dealers bids that incorporate the last-minute bids of customers arrive after the
submission deadline, and are rejected. We actually ¯nd evidence to the con-
trary. Only 1% of the total tenders, and 2% of the o±cial tenders submitted
by the dealers were late. However, the fact that we see so few late tenders does
not necessarily contradict our hypothesis that customers bid close to the auction
deadline to conceal their demand curve from dealers. This is because a customer
also knows that a bid that she submits too close to the submission deadline has
a higher likelihood of not being transmitted by the electronic auction system,
as the dealer through whom this bid has been submitted has hit his submission
limit, the maximum amount he can bid as a submitter.18 In this instance bid-
ding too close to the submission deadline would mean that the customer does
not participate in the auction, and will have to buy the security at a higher
price in the secondary market that follows the auction. If she has a large order,
which is when she will attempt to bid as late as possible, the consequence of not
participating can be particularly severe as this customer could be potentially
\squeezed" in the secondary market.
Evidence that is more in line with the hypothesis that customers bid close to
the auction deadline to prevent dealers from revising their bids emerges, when
we look at the bidders from whom the late bids originate, and the auctions where
the late bids are submitted. In case customers bid close to the bid submission
deadline to prevent dealers from revising their bids on seeing customer bids, we
should ¯nd that most of the late bids are dealer bids. We ¯nd that this is the
case. 77% of the late tenders were submitted by the primary dealers and 13%
by the customers.19
Finally, late bidding should be more pronounced for bond auctions rather
than treasury bill auctions as there is greater uncertainty in pricing the former,
and hence the tendency by customers to conceal their bids till the end should
be more pronounced for bond auctions than treasury bill auctions. This is
supported by the data as well. We ¯nd that the proportion of late tenders in
17The o±cial bid of a participant refers to the tender of this participant that is used to
determine the cuto® yield.
18When a dealer submits a bid on behalf of a customer on the electronic auction system, and
including this bid the dealer has bid in excess of the amount he is permitted as a submitter,
the auction system automatically does not transmit this bid and °ashes this message on the
dealer's screen. Since these bids are not entered in the auction system, they are not recorded,
and we could not analyze them.
19The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at the 99% level with the test statistic, Z=7.9.
19bond auctions is more than double that in treasury bill auctions.20 In addition
late tenders were submitted in twice as many bond auctions compared with
treasury bill auctions.21 If the value of order°ow information is greater in bond
compared with treasury bill auctions as we have hypothesized, then we should
¯nd that the di®erence in the amount paid by the bidders when the status of
the late tenders is changed from rejected to accepted is signi¯cantly greater for
bond rather than treasury bill. We ¯nd this to be the case with the former
being thrice the latter.22
Thus, although there is some suggestive evidence that customers may be bid-
ding close to the submission deadline to prevent dealers from revising their bids
upon observing customer bids, though the evidence is far from being conclusive.
7.2 Multiple-Submitter Customers
In Section 7.1 we observe one aspect of strategic bidding by customers to conceal
their demand curves from dealers: customers wait as late as they can to sub-
mit bids. In this section, we establish a second dimension of strategic bidding
by customers: customers submit bids through more than one dealer to avoid
revealing their demand curve to a single dealer.
There are two types of customers in our sample in terms of the average
number of dealers through whom a customer submits bids in an auction. Table
5 plots the frequency distribution of customers in terms of average number of
submitters used in an auction. It shows that about 10% of the customers used
more than one submitter in an auction. Henceforth, customers who have a
submitter average in an auction greater than or equal to 1.5, will be referred
to as multiple-submitter customers, and those who have a submitter average
of less than 1.5, will be referred to as single-submitter customers. This section
establishes that multiple-submitter customers submit bids through more than
one dealer to avoid revealing their demand curve to a single dealer as they realize
that dealers use customer bids to form an opinion about the cuto® price at the
auction.
Customers appear to use a larger number of dealers to submit bids when
they have a larger quantity of the security to buy. Let Si
t indicate the number
of submitters used by customer i in auction t, qi
t the total quantity demanded
by customer i through all submitter used by the customer in auction t, and IAt
is the amount of the security issued in auction t. We also de¯ne MPS as the









20For bonds, late tenders as a proportion of the number of auctions in the sample was 0.64;
for treasury bills the corresponding proportion was 0.31. The di®erence is signi¯cant at 99%
with the test statistic, Z=4.3.
21Late tenders were submitted in 50% of the bond auctions in the sample, and only 25% of
the treasury bill auctions. The di®erence was signi¯cant at 99% with the test statistic, Z=3.4.
22The di®erence is signi¯cant at the 95% level.
20Column (1) of Table 7 reports the regression of the number of submitters, Si
t, on




IAt; the slope coe±cient in this
regression is the marginal propensity to submit. Customers use an additional
dealer to submit tenders for a 36% increase in the ratio of bid amount to issue
amount, with this coe±cient being signi¯cant.
In general, a customer could be using multiple dealers as submitters in an
auction due to either one or both of two e®ects: \concealing e®ect" or the \sub-
mission limit" e®ect. \Concealing e®ect" refers to a customer using multiple
submitters in an auction to conceal his full demand curve from a single submit-
ter. \Submission limit" e®ect refers to a customer using multiple submitters in
an auction due to a binding constraint on a dealer as a submitter described in
Section 2.
A ¯rst test, which indirectly supports the hypothesis that multiple-dealer
customers submit bids through more than one dealer predominantly due to the
\concealing e®ect", is based on a comparative static that exploits the di®erences
in the temporal bidding patterns established for the dealer-side of the market
in the previous sections. Our results suggested that \information gathering" by
dealers from customers through which dealers obtain \second" opinion about
the cuto® price price, played a more important role for bond auctions compared
with treasury bill auctions. If these results were supported by the customer-
side of the market, the tendency to use a larger number of dealers in response
to quantity demanded due to the \concealing e®ect" should be much more
pronounced for bonds than treasury bills. That is, the marginal propensity to
randomize should be greater for bonds than for bills for all customers. We re-run
the regression in Column (1), Table 7 by interacting the ratio of bid amount to
issue amount with an indicator for bond auctions. Results in Column (2), Table
7 show that this is the case. For bond auctions, customers use an additional
dealer to submit tenders for a smaller increase in the ratio of bid amount to issue
amount compared with treasury bill auctions, and the di®erence is statistically
signi¯cant.23 But this result could also suggest that customers demand is higher
in bonds relative to treasury bills, and therefore it is the \submission limit" e®ect
that leads them to submit bids through multiple dealers. We ¯nd the reverse:
the ratio of bid amount to issue amount is 10% higher for treasury bills than
bonds, and this di®erence is statistically signi¯cant.
A second test of the hypothesis that multiple-dealer customers submit bids
through more than one dealer predominantly due to the \concealing e®ect",
is based on a comparative static that exploits the di®erence in the marginal
propensity to submit of single-submitter and multiple-submitter customers, in
auctions where they submit bids through two or more dealers. In these auctions,
both multiple-submitter customers and single-submitter customers use more
than one submitter; but the former do it due to both the \concealing e®ect" and
23For bond auctions, customers use an additional dealer to submit tenders for a 24% increase
in the ratio of bid amount to issue amount, and for treasury bill auctions they use an additional
dealer for a 40% increase in the ratio of the bid amount to issue amount.
21\submission limit" e®ect, and the latter do so only due to the \submission limit"
e®ect. Thus, for each additional dollar of the security demanded, a multiple-
submitter customer will spread his bids across a larger number of submitters
than a single-submitter customer re°ecting that multiple-submitter customers
use more than one submitter due to both the \concealing e®ect" and \submission
limit" e®ect, whereas single-submitter customers use more than one submitter
only due to the former. In short, a larger MPS of multiple-submitter customers
relative to single-submitter customers in auctions where both use two or more
dealers as submitters, supports the hypothesis that multiple-dealer customers
submit bids through more than one dealer predominantly due to the \concealing
e®ect".
Before testing this hypothesis, we need to control for customers who partic-
ipate only in a few auctions in the sample. Customers who participate in less
than 20% of the auctions of a speci¯c security will be referred to as passive cus-
tomers, and those who participate in more than 20% of the auctions of a speci¯c
security will be referred to as active customers.24 A test based on the compar-
ison of the MPS of single-submitter customers with that of multiple-submitter
customers, but without controlling for the presence of passive customers, may
not be conclusive. This follows from the proportion of passive customers to
total customers being signi¯cantly greater for single-submitter than multiple-
submitter customers as documented in Table 6, and passive customers bidding
di®erently from active customers. Since they participate in so few auctions,
it is conceivable that passive customers do not learn that dealers are likely to
use their order°ow information to revise their opinion about the cuto® yield;
hence they do not use multiple submitters. In addition, we also ¯nd that passive
customers demand smaller quantities than active customers on an average.25
Controlling for passive customers, the regression in Column (1) of Table 6
is re-run to test for \concealing e®ect" and \submission limit" e®ect hypoth-
esis. The sample consists of o±cial tenders of customers in auctions where
they use two or more dealers as submitters. Column (3) reports the results of
this regression, with rows 2-5 reporting the MPS of multiple-submitter active,
single-submitter active, multiple-submitter passive and single-submitter passive
customers, respectively. While multiple-submitter active customers use an ad-
ditional submitter for a 45% increase in the proportion of bid amount to issue
amount, single-submitter active customers actually decrease the number of sub-
mitters with an increase in the proportion of bid amount to issue amount, with
the di®erence in the MPS being signi¯cant.
24Auctions for 30 year GOC securities are the least frequent in our sample, with a total
of 10 auctions. We need a customer's participation in at least 2 auctions to study strategic
bidding across auctions. Thus 20% was selected as the cuto® participation level.
25A test of the di®erence in the average of
qi
t
IAt between active and passive customers yields
a test statistic of 8.79, with Prob(Z > 8:79) = 0.
227.3 Customers in Long Term Dealer Relationship
If customers use multiple dealers to conceal their demand schedules from cus-
tomers, how do we explain the existence of active single-submitter customers?
We ¯nd that some of the active single-submitter customers are in long-term
relationship with their dealers, and are compensated by the dealers for the
information provided by these repeated interactions. The payo® to these cus-
tomers is primarily in the form of these customers paying lower prices at an
auctions when they submit bids through the dealer with whom they are in long-
term relationship, compared with when they submit bids in the same auction
through other dealers. Thus, the bid revision by dealers on seeing customer bids
is much more pronounced when customers in long-term relationship submit bids
through dealers other than the long-term dealer. In keeping with the di®erence
in \information aggregation" between bonds and treasury bills, we also ¯nd that
the payo® hypothesis is con¯ned to the bond auctions, with customers who are
in long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector being compensated by the
dealer in the bond sector.
To show the existence of a long-term relationship, we want to show that
single-submitter customers who are active submit a large proportion of their bids
through a distinct submitter throughout the sample.26 Thus we are going to
concentrate on customers in row 1, Table 5; these customers are single-submitter
customers. Single-submitter active customers can be obtained from row 2, Ta-
ble 6, with the \average" column indicating that 19% of the nonrandomizing
customers are active on an average across maturity range. However Tables 5
and 6 do not indicate that when on an average one submitter was used, was that
submitter a distinct submitter or not, which is what we need to establish the
existence of a long-term relationship. Hence, for each of the single-submitter
active customers, we construct the ratio of number of auctions in which a spe-
ci¯c submitter was used, to the total number of auctions in which the customer
participated, for each distinct submitter used by a single-submitter active cus-
tomer. This is referred to as a customer's submitter proportion. For each
customer, we tested if the highest and second-highest submitter proportion is
signi¯cantly di®erent. Customers for whom this is the case are customers with
long-term relationship with a speci¯c dealer in that they submit most of their
tenders in the sample period through a distinct dealer. Table 8 lists these cus-
tomers. For example, customer TEA is a single-submitter active customer who
has a long-term relationship with dealer WXZ in treasury-bill auctions. TEA
participates in 25% of the treasury bill auctions held in the sample period. In
78% of these treasury-bill auctions in which customer TEA participates, he uses
dealer WXZ as the submitter.
Having established the existence of a long-term dealer relationship, we now
explore what kind of payo®s a customer gets from being in this long-term rela-
tionship with a dealer. We test three hypothesis about whether the average price
26Passive single-submitter customers are excluded from this exercise as we cannot establish
long-run relationship for these customers in our sample period.
23paid by a customer di®ers depending on whether a customer is in a long-term
dealer relationship or not.
The ¯rst hypothesis we test is whether in the sector where there is a long-
term relationship, a customer pays a lower price when he submits tenders
through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship, compared with
the dealers with whom he is not in a long term relationship. Table 9, columns
(1) and (2) report the results of these tests. The sample for testing this hy-
pothesis comprises of allotted tenders of only those customers who are in long
term relationship, in the sector(s) where there is long term relationship. These
tenders could be submitted either through the dealer with whom the customer
is in a long term relationship, or through the dealer with whom the customer
is not in a long term relationship. For each tender allotted to a customer in
an auction,27 we construct the quantity weighted average price; the di®erence
in quantity weighted average price and the cuto® price of the auction in which
this tender was allotted, referred to as mark-up, is our dependent variable. For
the regression in Column (1), Table 9, the explanatory variable is a dummy
variable ltC ltD. This variable takes the value 1 if the tender allotted to the
customer was submitted through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term
relationship, and 0 if it is submitted through any other dealer. While customers
in a long-term relationship pay 0.5 cents less when they submit tenders through
their long-term dealer compared with other dealers, this di®erence is not signif-
icant.28
But we have documented the di®erence in behaviour across maturity range
in the analysis in the previous sections. Exploiting this di®erence, we re-run the
regression in column (1), Table 9 introducing dummy variables for whether the
long-term relationship is in the bond or the treasury bill sector. The results of
this regression are reported in column (2), Table 9. BD ltC ltD (TB ltC ltD)
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a customer in a long-term relationship
in the bond (treasury bill) sector, submits the tender through the dealer with
whom he is in long-term relationship in that sector, and takes value 0 if the
tender is submitted through a dealer other than the long-term dealer. Similary,
TB ltC nltD is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a customer in a long-
term relationship in the treasury bill sector, submits the tender through the
dealer with whom he is not in a long-term relationship in that sector, and 0
if the tender is submitted through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term
relationship.29
In keeping with the spirit of the results in the previous sections, we now ¯nd
di®erences emerging in the pay-o® hypothesis, depending on whether the long-
27A customer could be allotted more than one tender in an auction as he has the option of
submitting his tenders through more than one dealer.
28t=-1.21, Pr(t > 1:21) = 0:89.
29The constant in the regression in column (2) is the di®erence in the quantity weighted
average price and cuto® price of allotted tenders of customers in long-term relationship in the
bond sector, submitted through the dealers other than the dealer with whom they are in a
long-term relationship in the bond sector.
24term relationship is in the bond or treasury bill sector. We ¯nd that customers
in long-term relationship in the bond sector, pay 3 cents less in bond auctions
when they submit tenders through the dealer with whom they are in a long-term
relationship compared with submitting tenders through other dealers, and this
di®erence is signi¯cant. Customers in a long-term relationship in the treasury
bill sector, pay 0.2 cents less in treasury bill auctions when they submit tenders
through the dealer with whom they are in a long-term relationship compared
with submitting tenders through other dealers; but this di®erence is not statis-
tically signi¯cant.30 These results hold when we control for di®erences in the
quantity weighted average price and cuto® price between customers, irrespective
of whether they submit tenders through long-term dealers or other dealers.31
>From the results in columns (1)-(2), Table 9, we see that customers in a
long-term relationship in the bond sector are compensated by the dealer with
whom they are in long-term relationship through a lower price compared with
when these customers submit tenders through other dealers. This result does
not go through for treasury bills. This leads to the question whether customers
in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector are being compensated in
the bond sector by the dealer with whom they are in a long-term relationship.
This is the second hypothesis we test, with the results for this hypothesis
test reported in Table 9, column (5). The sample to test this hypothesis is
built as follows. We ¯rst isolate customers in a long-term relationship in the
treasury bill sector who participate in bond auctions but are not in a long-term
relationship in the bond sector. Our sample comprises of allotted tenders of
these customers in bond auctions. These tenders could be submitted through
the dealer with whom this customer is in a long-term relationship in the treasury
bill sector, or through other dealers. A dummy variable, ltD tb, which takes the
value 1 for the former tenders and 0 for the latter tenders, is our explanatory
variable.32 Our dependent variable is the quantity weighted average price minus
the cuto® price of the tenders allotted to the customers in our sample. Column
(5) reports the results of this regression. Even though the customer is in a
long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector, this customer pays 9 cents
less in bond auctions when he submits tenders in bond auctions through the
30F=0.21, F(1;196;0:95) = 3:84.
31This is done by re-running the regression in column(2), Table 9 after adding a dummy
variable for each of the customers listed in Table 8 to the set of explanatory variables in
column (2), Table 9. Customers in long-term relationship in the bond sector still pay 3 cents
less in bond auctions when they submit tenders through the dealer with whom they are in
a long-term relationship compared with submitting tenders through other dealers, and this
di®erence is signi¯cant. Customers in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector, pay
0.07 cents less in treasury bill auctions when they submit tenders through the dealer with
whom they are in a long-term relationship compared with submitting tenders through other
dealers, and the di®erence is not signi¯cant. In both cases the signi¯cance of the di®erence,
or the lack of it, changes dramatically compared to the results in column (2), Table 9 with
t=-12.99 for bonds and F ¼ 0 for treasury bills.
32Thus, the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the customer is submitting the tender in
bond auctions through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship in the treasury
bill sector. It takes the value 0 if the tender is being submitted in a bond auction through
any dealer other than the long-term dealer.
25dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector.
In addition, we ¯nd that the price paid by these customers in bond auctions
is comparable to the price paid by customers in long-term relationship in bond
auctions, when they submit tenders through dealers with whom they are in a
long-term relationship in the bond sector.33
The third pay-o® hypothesis we test is whether a customer in a long-term
dealer relationship pays a lower price compared with customers who are not
in long-term dealer relationship, in the maturity sector where the customer is
in a long-term relationship. Table 9, columns (3) and (4), report the results
of this test. The sample to test this hypothesis is built as follows. >From the
previous sample, we remove all tenders submitted by the customer through the
dealer with whom he is not in a long-term relationship. This gives us allotted
tenders of customers who are in long-term relationship, submitted through the
dealer with whom they are in long-term relationship, in the sector in which the
customer is in a long-term relationship. We add allotted tenders submitted by
customers who are not in a long-term relationship in treasury bill and bond
auctions. These customers either use more than one submitter in an auction
(multiple-submitter customers with a submitter proportion greater than 1), or
they use one submitter in an auction, but this submitter is not a distinct
submitter.
Column (3) reports the results of the regression of the di®erence of quantity
weighted average price and the cuto® price on the dummy variable ltC ltD.
This dummy variable takes the value 1 if the tender allotted to the customer was
submitted through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship, and 0
if the customer is not in a long-term relationship.34 In the sector where there is
a long-term relationship, customers in long-term relationship when submitting
tenders through the dealer with whom they are in long-term relationship, pay
0.5 cents more than customers who are not in long-term dealer relationship,
and this di®erence is signi¯cant at the 99% level.35 In Column (4), Table 9 we
run the same regression, but now introducing the distinction between treasury
bills and bond auctions. In both the treasury bill and bond sector, customers in
long-term relationship when they submit tenders through the dealer with whom
they are in long-term relationship, pay more compared with customers who are
not in long-term relationship. For bonds (treasury bills), the former pay 1 (0.5)
cents more than the latter, and this di®erence is statistically signi¯cant.
This result appears counterintuitive at ¯rst in that customers in long-term
relationship pay a higher price for Government of Canada securities when sub-
mitting tenders through the long-term dealer, compared with customers who
33While the former pay 4 cents above cuto® price, the latter pay 6 cents (this is obtained as
the sum of the constant and the coe±cient of the dummy variable bd ltC ltD in column (2),
Table 9). In addition, the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant at the 95% level; t=0.63,
t(14, 0.95)=1.8, with the t-statistic calculated using pooled variance of the two sample of
customers.
34The constant in the regression in column (3) is the di®erence in the quantity weighted
average price and cuto® price of the customers who are not in a long-term relationship.
35t = 2:72, P(t > 2:72) = 0:997.
26are not in a long-term relationship. What might explain this result? Given
the fact that the long-term customer and his dealer interact with each other
in sectors other than Government of Canada securities, it is conceivable that
the payo®s to the long-term customers are being given in these sectors by the
long-term dealer. The second hypothesis tested above suggests that this could
be the case. Alternatively, it is conceivable that a customer enters a long-term
relationship with a dealer because institutional reasons speci¯c to a customer's
business push him to the inelastic part of his demand curve relative to customers
who are not in a long-term relationship.36
Thus, customers who are in a long-term relationship with a dealer, are ad-
equately compensated by the dealer for the information provided by the cus-
tomers in repeated interactions.
8 Conclusion
This paper establishes that in the issuance process of Government of Canada
securities where direct access to primary issuance is restricted to authorized
security dealers, \order-°ow" information is potentially the key source of private
information for these security dealers. \Order-°ow" information is revealed to
a security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids
in the auctions only through the authorized security dealer. Since each dealer
interacts with a di®erent set of customers, they, in e®ect, see di®erent portions of
the market demand and supply curves, leading to di®ering \private" inferences
of where the equilibrium price might lie.
What if this source of private information was \dissipated" through a change
in the mechanism to issue government securities? This could happen either
by allowing direct access to customers to place bids in the primary issuance,
and/or imposing some form of transparency obligations on the authorized se-
curity dealers with respect to their secondary market activity. For example, in
Italy, the secondary market is transparent in that it is a centralized, regulated
electronic screen-based market. However, only authorized dealers are allowed to
place bids in primary issuance, and as we point out in the Introduction, Drudi
and Massa (2001) show how authorized dealers use the discrepancy in trans-
parency to obtain government securities in the less transparent primary market
at below-market prices. In the U.S., customers are allowed to place bids in the
primary issuance, making the primary market transparent. But unlike Italy,
the secondary market is largely over-the-counter, with the customer-dealer in-
teraction protocol requiring the customer to even reveal his intention to buy or
sell when he requests a quote! The Italian and the U.S. comparison, along with
several other countries examined by Sareen (2003), highlight that a mechanism
for issuing government securities appears to retain privacy of a security dealer's
36For example, a customer that is a pension fund could be legally required to hold a certain
proportion of its portfolio in the form of Government of Canada securities. This may not be
the case for another customer that is a hedge fund.
27\order-°ow" in at least one the markets in which the dealer is participating.
Which one will be less costly for the issuer? Which one will increase partic-
ipation in the primary issuance? These questions will be explored in future
research.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of Last Minute Bidding to Term TypeTable1: Average Absolute Prediction Error
Maturity # Dealers Mean (cents.) Std. Dev. (c Min (cents) Max (cents)
1 Month 14 0.38 0.33 0.11 1.11
3 months 17 0.55 0.42 0.18 1.63
1 year 18 1.59 1.22 0.61 5.3
2 years 21 3.72 3.18 0.42 14.72
3 years 21 4.58 4.78 0.96 18.05
5 years 21 8.71 6.04 2.15 24.3
6 years 21 10.37 10.71 1.41 43.18
10 years 21 20.01 20.74 4.66 76.01
30 years 21 45.56 32.49 15.47 146.96
The "prediction error" is calculated, for each auction, as the absolute value of the 
difference between the dealer's quantity-weighted average price bid and the cutoff
price of the auction. This is averaged, for each dealer, over all auctions within the
maturity category listed in the table.Table 2: Prediction Error Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abs. Prediction Error Abs. Prediction Error Abs. Prediction Error Abs. Prediction Error
log(Dealer Size) 0.016 0.030 0.036 0.001
(0.006)** (0.017)* (0.017)** (0.038)
log(Customer Size) -0.027 -0.006 -0.003
(0.013)** (0.016) (0.024)






Bond*No. of Customers -0.243
(0.089)***
Constant -0.310 -0.126 -0.549 -0.038
(0.130)** (0.335) (0.384) (0.733)
Observations 175 111 111 111
R-squared 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.64
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable is the (averaged over auctions) absolute value of the difference between quantity-weighted price bids and the auction’s cutoff price.
Dealer Size is measured as the dollar amount (averaged over auctions) that a dealer placed bids for on its own behalf.
Customer Size is measured as the dollar amount (averaged over auctions) that a dealer placed bids for on behalf of its customers.
Number of Customers is the average number of unique customers that a dealer serves per auction.
Bond is a dummy variable that equals 1 for securities that are more than 1 year in maturity
Maturity fixed effects are supressedTable 3: Comparison of the Timing of Dealer vs. Customer 
All Maturities Bills Bonds
Submission Time of  8.64 9.59 2.27
Dealer Bid s.d.= 7.92 s.d.= 8.03 s.d.= 2.15
(minutes from deadline)
Submission Time of  9.08 9.71 4.81
Customer Bid s.d.= 6.81 s.d.=6.87 s.d.= 4.53
(minutes from deadline)
Difference -0.43*** -0.12 -2.54***
Std.err. 0.20 0.23 0.29
P-value 0.02 0.3 0
% of times Dealer Bid 55.29% 52.39% 74.90%
precedes Customer Bid
Number of comparisons 2042 1779 263
"Submission Time of Dealer Bids" measures the time, in minutes, 
before the auction deadline at which the last dealer bid is submitted.
"Submission Time of Customer Bid" measures the time, in minutes, 
before the auction deadline at which the last customer bid is submitted,
for the same auction and same dealer as above.
The reported "Difference" is the result of a pairwise t-test. Standard errors
and p-value of the test are reported.Table 4: What Drives Dealers' Bid Revisions?
Dependent variable: % Change in Dealer's Bid During Period
Last 10 Minutes of the Auction Last 30 Minutes of the Auction
Entire Sample T-Bills Bonds Entire Sample T-Bills Bonds
% Change in Customers' 0.297*** 0.0046 0.299*** 0.094*** -0.011 0.054
Bids During Period (0.033) (0.0074) (0.098) (0.016) (0.050) (0.049)
(averaged over customers)
Change in Dealer's 0.0177*** -1.81e-07 0.186*** -0.016*** -0.00037*** -0.015***
Net Position (0.0057) (0.00006) (0.054) (0.001) (0.00006) (0.004)
Number of Unique Customer 0.00003 -1.63e-06 0.00018  0.000059 2.73e-08 0.0004
Bids Received by Dealer (0.0001) (1.12e-06) (0.00089) (0.00004) (1.17e-06) (0.0004)
Number of Customers 0.00009 4.02e-06** -0.00041  -0.00015 -1.94e-06 0.0016**
Revising Bids During Period (0.0002) (1.59e-06) (0.00110) (0.000097)  (1.87e-06) (0.0006)
Observations 1918 1672 246 1909 1667 242
No. of Auctions 213 153 60 213 153 60
Avg. Observations/Auction 9 10.9 4.1 9 10.9 4
R-sq: within 0.0508 0.0048 0.1044 0.1561 0.0201 0.2187
between 0.0372 0.0004 0.0424 0.0370 0.0134 0.0150
overall 0.0533 0.0031 0.1040 0.1427 0.0202 0.1853
Notes: Each column reports the estimated coefficients from a fixed effects regression. The dependent variable is the percent change (calculated as a log
first difference) between a dealer's standing price bid at 10 or 30 minutes before the bid submission deadline, and the dealer's official bid. The first 
independent variable is the percent change between this dealer's customers' price bids during the last 10 or 30 minutes in the auction. The second
independent variable is the change in the dealer's reported net long (or short) position during the last 10 or 30 minutes of the auction. We also control for
the number of unique customer bids received by the dealer, and the number of customers who revised their bids within the last 10 or 30 minutes in the auction.
To purge the effect of public information sources in comovements across customer and dealer bid changes, we control for auction-level fixed effects in the
regressions. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. Significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent leves are denoted by *,**, and ***.Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Customers Who Participated in
At least One Auction in Terms of Average # of Submitters
Avg # of Submitters Bonds Treasury Bills Customer Type
< 1:5 74 95 Single-Submitter
1.5 & < 2:5 18 18 Multiple-Submitter
2.5 & < 3:5 6 8 Multiple-Submitter
The numbers in this table referr to unique customer participation and not unique
customers. Suppose a customer ABC participates in 30 year bond auctions, and
1 year treasury bill auctions in the sample. Then we obtain the average number
of submitters used by this customer in the 30 year bond auction and the 1 year
treasury bill auction. Suppose the average number of submitters used by this
customer is 3 for the former and 1 for the latter auctions. This customer will
then appear in row (1) under the "Treasury Bill" column, and row (3) undeer
the "Bonds" column.
Table 6: Active vs Passive Customers
Bond Treasury Bill Average
# of multiple-submitter passive customers
# of multiple-submitter customers 0.4 0.57 0.49
# of single-submitter passive customers
# of single-submitter customers 0.82 0.80 0.81
The column \average" is the average ratio across maturity range. The di®erence
in the \average" ratio between multiple-submitter passive and single-submitter
passive customers is signi¯cant at 1%, with Z = 34.01.Table 7: Customers Use Multiple Dealers
(1) (2) (3)
bid amount






Issue Amount)*(Multiple-Submitter Active) 2:24¤¤
(0.8)
( bid amount
Issue Amount)*(Single-Submitter Active) ¡3:49¤¤
(1.04)
( bid amount
Issue Amount)*(Multiple-Submitter Passive) -2.1
(1.74)
( bid amount
Issue Amount)*(Single-Submitter Passive) ¡8:01¤
(3.68)
constant 1.329 1.32 2.6
(0.029) (0.03) (0.06)
Observations 1413 1413 385
R-squared 0.0285 0.03 0.08
F¤
msa¡ssa 24:45¤¤
¤¤ signi¯cant at 99%; ¤ signi¯cant at 95%; standard error are given in parenthe-
sis. Dependent variable is Si
t, the number of submitters used by customer i in
auction t. bid amount




IAt, the amount bid by customer i in auc-
tion t over the amount issued in auction t. (Single-Submitter Active), (Single-
Submitter Passive), (Multiple-Submitter Active), and (Multiple-Submitter Pas-
sive) are 0-1 dummy variables that take a value of 1 if in auction t, customer i is
a single-submitter active customer, single-submitter passive customer, multiple-
submitter active customer, and multiple-submitter passive customer, respec-
tively, and zero otherwise. The sample in columns (1)-(2) consists of o±cial
tenders of all customers. The sample in column (3) consists of o±cial tenders
of all customers in auctions where they submit tenders through two or more
dealers. F¤
msa¡ssa is the F-statistic for the di®erence in the marginal propen-
sity to submit, MPS, of multiple-submitter active and single-submitter active
customers.Table 8: Customers with Long Term Dealer Relationship
Customer Maturity Range Submitter Submitter Participation
Proportion Proportion
TEA T-Bill WXZ 0.782 0.245
OEO T-Bill DZZ 0.667 0.217
GUO T-Bill JDW 0.851 0.566
ZXN T-Bill KVY 0.778 0.248
TDI Bond DZZ 0.79 0.33
ZAW Bond DZZ 0.883 0.286
EQV T-Bill KVY 1.000 0.229Table 9: Payo® to Customers with Long Term Dealer Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ltC ltD -0.005 0.005
(0.0041) (0.0016)
BD ltC ltD -0.03 0.01
(0.012) (0.006)
TB ltC ltD -0.086 -0.042
(0.010 ) (0.003)






constant 0.0137 0.092 0.0067 0.05 0.125
(0.0036) (0.01) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.029)
Observations 196 196 896 896 25
R-squared 0.008 0.44 0.008 0.35 0.09
(ltC ltD ¡ ltC nltD) -0.005
(-1.21)
(ltC ltD ¡ ltC nltD) BD ¡0:03¤¤¤
(2.55)
(ltC ltD ¡ ltC nltD) TB -0.002
(0.206)
(ltC ltD ¡ nltC) 0:005¤¤¤
(2.72)
(ltC ltD ¡ nltC) BD 0:01¤¤¤
(2.03)
(ltC ltD ¡ nltC) TB 0:005¤¤
(12.22)
(ltD tb ¡ nltD tb) ¡0:09¤
(-1.49)
¤ ¤ ¤ signi¯cant at 99%; ¤¤ signi¯cant at 95%; ¤ signi¯cant at 90%; standard
error in parenthesis above the double lines. Dependent variable is the di®erence
in the quantity weighted average price of the allotted tenders and the cuto®
price in Canadian dollars. Both the quantity weighted average price and the
cuto® price are quoted in terms of $(CD) 100 of the security allotted.Table 9 continued..
The sample for the regressions in columns (1) and (2) comprises of allotted ten-
ders of only those customers who are in long term relationship, in the sector(s)
where there is long term relationship. The sample for the regressions in columns
(3) and (4) comprises of: allotted tenders of customers who are in long-term
relationship, submitted through the dealer with whom they are in long-term
relationship, in the sector in which the customer is in a long-term relationship;
allotted tenders submitted by customers who are not in a long-term relationship
in either the bond or the treasury bill sector. The sample for the regression in
column (5) comprises of tenders allotted in bond auctions to customers who
are in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector. ltC ltD takes the
value 1 if a customer in a long-term relationship submits the tender through
the long-term dealer in the sector where there is a long-term relationship, and
0 otherwise. BD ltC ltD (TB ltC ltD) is the same dummy variable with the
added condition that the long-term relationship is in the bond (treasury bill)
sector. TB ltC nltD takes value 1 if the allotted tender of the customer in a
long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector is submitted in treasury bill
auctions through dealers other than the one with whom he is in a long-term
relationship, and 0 otherwise. TB nltC takes value 1 if the allotted tender is
submitted by a customer who is not in a long-term relationship in the treasury
bill sector, and 0 otherwise. ltD tb takes value 1 if in bond auctions, the allot-
ted tender of a customer in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector
is submitted through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship,
and zero otherwise. Rows below the double lines compare the di®erence in the
quantity weighted average price of the allotted tenders and the cuto® price, for
two sets of customers. Row (1) is this di®erence for customers in a long-term
relationship when they submit tenders through the long-term dealer, compared
with when they submit tenders through other dealers, in the sector where there
is long-term relationship. Rows (2) and (3) are identical to Row (1), except that
they pertain to the long-term relationship being in the bond and the treasury
bill sectors, respectively. Row (4) is the di®erence for customers in a long-term
relationship when they submit tenders through the long-term dealer, compared
with customers who are not in a long-term relationship, in auctions belonging to
the sector where there is long-term relationship. Rows (5) and (6) are identical
to Row (4), except that they pertain to the long-term relationship being in the
bond and the treasury bill sectors, respectively. Finally, row (7) pertains to cus-
tomers who are in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector; it is the
di®erence in the quantity weighted average price and cuto® price of tenders sub-
mitted in a bond auction through the dealer with whom they are in a long-term
relationship in the treasury bill sector, compared with any dealer other than the
long-term dealer. Rows (1)-(3), rows (4)-(6), and row (7), test the ¯rst, third,
and the second pay-o® hypothesis described in Section 7.3. Test statistics for
testing the signi¯cance of the di®erence across two sets of customers described
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